Tag Archive for exposure draft

Over-reaction to the Multiflex case will erode confidence in the GST system

The post on 9 January 2012 (link) discussed the Multiflex case and serious concerns with the previous proposed legislative amendment allowing the Commissioner to retain net refund amounts claimed on Business Activity Statements pending verification of the refund entitlement by the ATO.

On 15 February 2012 Treasury released a revised draft (link) of proposed section 8AAZLGA to be inserted into the Taxation Administration Act.

While some of the concerns with the previous draft version of section 8AAZLGA have been addressed, in its present draft form the proposed provision still seriously inhibits taxpayers’ rights, particularly start-ups or taxpayers normally in a net payment position which make large one-off capital acquisitions, including property developers.

While the Commissioner needs to have the power to protect the revenue from suspected fraud or evasion, the balance has shifted too far in the Commissioner’s favour.  It also potentially has application beyond just GST refunds, for example into income tax refunds and fuel tax credit claims.

The draft legislation allows the Commissioner to retain a refund amount in a BAS if the Commissioner is satisfied that it would be reasonable to require verification of information contained in the BAS and relating to the refund amount.  The Commissioner must inform the taxpayer that the refund is being retained (which does not even need to be in writing), in most cases within 14 days of lodging the BAS.

The Commissioner may then continue to retain the refund for a further 60 days, extended by the time within that 60 day period in which the Commissioner is waiting for the taxpayer to respond to an information request.  For at least 74 days there is then no requirement for the Commissioner to even give any reasons for the continued retention of the refund or make any information request.

After the end of that 60 day period (as extended due to information requests), the Commissioner can extend the period even more, indefinitely, provided the Commissioner informs the taxpayer within a further 14 days.  At least this further ability to continue to retain the refund is supposedly fettered to some extent, as various factors are listed which the Commissioner must have regard to, namely:

(a)    the likelihood that the information in the BAS is inaccurate, and the extent of the inaccuracy;

(b)   the likelihood that the information was affected by fraud or evasion, intentional disregard or recklessness;

(c)    whether retaining the amount is necessary for the protection of the revenue, including the likelihood of the Commissioner being later able to recover any refund paid;

(d)   any complexity involved in verifying the information;

(e)   the impact on the taxpayer’s financial position of retaining the amount; and

(f)     any other matter the Commissioner considers relevant.

These are however exceptionally broad, especially (a), (d) and (f), and only one of these, (e), recognises any taxpayer rights.  The Explanatory Memorandum also states any one other factor may outweigh (e) anyway.

The taxpayer does then have the right to object against the Commissioner’s decision to retain the refund once this further “indefinite period” starts, but this is not an objection in respect of the net amount for the tax period but only against the reasonableness of the Commissioner’s decision to retain the refund for further verification, where the listed factors are so heavily stacked in the Commissioner’s favour anyway.  Even if the taxpayer was successful the Commissioner could then issue an assessment which the taxpayer would also need to object against. The whole process could then be extremely protracted.

The only other possible recourse for a taxpayer would seem to be to institute judicial review proceedings under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act at any stage on the basis that the Commissioner did not act reasonably in requiring verification.

To achieve any sort of sensible fairness the draft legislation must be changed to compel the Commissioner to issue an assessment or pay the refund far earlier.  The equivalent New Zealand legislation requires payment of the refund within 30 days of lodgement of the return.

The Full Federal Court in the Multiflex case referred to New Zealand GST case law on its legislative provision in commenting that GST is intended to operate and does operate in a business environment where “offsetting” of input tax credits avoids a “cascading” of tax, so that confidence in the GST system would be eroded by delay on the part of the Commissioner in making refunds.

There is a need for a balance between the prompt payment of refunds and the protection of the GST system from abuse, but for the Commissioner to effectively have the power to withhold a taxpayer’s refund entitlement indefinitely without even needing to give an explanation and with very limited ability of the taxpayer to expeditiously challenge the Commissioner’s decision, is unacceptable in any business environment.

It is reasonable to presume that the ATO has had significant input into these proposals. While the Commissioner will have the ability to pay refunds more quickly or issue assessments more promptly to bring matters to a head, in practice it is not too hard to envisage the legislated timeframes becoming normal ATO practice, regardless of whether there is suspected fraud or evasion.

Consultation on the draft legislation is extremely short, closing on 21 February 2012. The legislation is proposed to commence as soon as it receives Royal Assent.

Regardless of the final form of the new legislation, taxpayers would be well advised to contact the ATO prior to making any unusual net refund claim and present documentary evidence of the claim, to hopefully avoid a significant delay in its payment.

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New proposed RITC rate for trustee services

The ATO has for some time been unhappy with the manner in which many trusts have been claiming 75% reduced input tax credits (RITCs) for GST incurred on services acquired through their trustee or responsible entity by “inappropriate bundling”. The Government announced in the May 2010 Budget that the law would be changed from 1 July 2012, and the proposed changes to the GST regulations were released on 13 January 2012 in an Exposure Draft (link).

Investment trusts are generally unable to claim input tax credits for GST incurred as they make input taxed financial supplies, although they can claim RITCs for 75% of the GST incurred on acquisitions listed in items in regulation 70-5.02(2) of the A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Regulations 1999.  Many trusts have been claiming RITCs of 75% of the GST on every cost they incur, on the basis that they are part of “trustee services” within item 29 or “single responsible entity services” within item 31. Trusts can of course also claim normal input tax credits to the extent costs relate to their making taxable or GST-free supplies (if any).

While a trust is not a legal entity, it is effectively treated as an entity for GST purposes, being the trustee acting in its capacity as trustee of the trust (ie separate to its corporate/individual capacity). The trustee therefore acts in two separate capacities for GST purposes, and may make supplies and acquisitions in either of those two capacities.

Remuneration for trustees for their services and cost recovery arrangements can take many different forms depending upon the precise wording of the trust deed and associated documents. This could include:

  1. reimbursement out of the trust fund for expenses incurred, with or without an additional specific trustee fee
  2. trustee remuneration on a full cost recovery basis, with or without a mark-up
  3. a single amount (eg a fixed fee or a percentage of funds under management) covering both recovery of expenses and trustee remuneration.

What is the consideration for the acquisition of RITC-eligible “trustee services” by the trust in these scenarios?  In which of the two capacities is the trustee incurring external costs?

In the first scenario only the specific trustee fee would likely be consideration for supplying trustee services and covered by item 29, and the individual expenses would need to be separately examined for RITC-eligibility pursuant to other items in regulation 70-5.02(2).  Some of these expenses, eg advertising, tax compliance and audit expenses, would not by themselves be RITC-eligible.

However, arguably the expenses in the second and third scenarios above are effectively bundled into the trustee’s consideration for supplying RITC-eligible trustee services and so become RITC-eligible for the trust.  This is the distortion the proposed amendments are trying to redress.

The initial Government announcement was that the law would be changed to “unbundle” the trustee acquisitions in the bundled scenarios referred to above.  The Exposure Draft legislation now released however proposes an alternative option “favoured for simplicity and clarity” which introduces a new lower 55% RITC rate for trustee services.

New item 32 is proposed to be inserted into regulation 70-5.02(2) for services acquired by a “recognised trust scheme”, to the extent the services are performed on or after 1 July 2012. The services covered by item 32 are the acquisitions qualifying for the 55% RITCs.

Item 32 will only apply if the trustee carries on an enterprise in its own capacity that includes making taxable supplies to the recognised trust scheme, eg it will not apply where the trustee is not GST-registered in its corporate capacity. It also may not then apply if the trustee does not itself receive any remuneration for trustee services, eg in the first scenario above but where there is no specific trustee fee.

Also, specified services covered by other items will remain eligible for 75% RITCs, including:

  • brokerage services
  • investment portfolio management functions
  • certain administrative functions, and
  • custody services.

The 55% RITCs would appear to be available to the trust regardless of which of the two capacities the trustee originally incurred external costs in, although the need to determine the capacity in which the trustee incurs a cost is not completely removed by these proposals. For example, the trustee needs to know what to report on the Business Activity Statements prepared in its corporate capacity. Also, when a cost is incurred from overseas, the capacity in which the trustee incurs the cost may dictate whether the trust needs to reverse charge GST or the trustee needs to charge GST to the trust instead.

The result should then be that all GST-bearing services acquired the trust are eligible for either 75% or 55% RITCs, but there will still be some work to do to allocate costs between these two GST recovery buckets.

Note also that proposed item 32 only applies to a “recognised trust scheme”.  This is defined to be a managed investment scheme under section 9 of the Corporations Act 2001, or an approved deposit fund, pooled superannuation trust, public sector superannuation scheme or regulated superannuation fund (other than a self managed superannuation fund) within the meaning of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993.  Other types of trusts will still be subject to the existing rules.

While it will cover unregistered managed investment schemes as well as registered ones, there could be an issue as to whether all of the trusts (eg sub-trusts) in an investment trust hierarchy satisfy the Corporations Act definition and are therefore covered by item 32 as currently drafted.

Comments on these proposals close on 24 February 2012. Investment funds should closely examine the impact of these proposals, including how particular acquisitions would be classified from 1 July 2012 under these proposals, the potential financial impact, what system changes would be needed, and whether they wish to participate in the consultation process.

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